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ABSTRACT 
In this paper a novel fragile watermarking scheme is proposed to detect, localize and recover malicious 
modifications in relational databases. In the proposed scheme, all tuples in the database are first securely 
divided into groups. Then watermarks are embedded and verified group-by-group independently. By 
using the embedded watermark, we are able to detect and localize the modification made to the database 
and even we recover the true data from the database modified locations. Our experimental results show 
that this scheme is so qualified; i.e. distortion detection and true data recovery both are performed 
successfully.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
With the widespread use of computers and internet, access and exchange of digital data became 
an extremely simple task. Since digital data can be easily duplicated and modified, there is a 
great deal of concern about the integrity and intellectual property protection of these data. 
A new technology, known as digital watermarking, provides a promising method of protecting 
digital data from illicit copying and manipulation by embedding a secret code directly into the 
data. The embedded secret code, called watermark, can be used in various applications such as 
copyright protection, integrity checking, and fingerprinting. 
In short, digital watermarking refers to embedding a secret imperceptible signal (watermark) in 
the original data. In this paper, we mainly consider digital watermarking schemes for database 
integrity. Generally, the digital watermarking for integrity verification is called fragile 
watermarking as compared to robust watermarking for copyright protection.  
In a robust watermarking scheme, the embedded watermark should be robust against attacks 
which aim at removing the watermark or making it undetectable. While in a fragile 
watermarking scheme, the embedded watermark should be fragile to modifications so as to 
detect and localize or even recover the modifications. Most of the fragile watermarking scheme 
studied in the last few years, were about multimedia watermarking. Most of them focus on 
digital images [7, 8]; some have been extended to digital video, and audio data [4, 15].  
Recently, some researchers have recognized the importance of watermarking databases and 
proposed some watermarking schemes to protect relational databases [2]. However, these 
schemes are robust schemes, which are designed for copyright protection. Though it is very 
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important to protect the ownership of databases, sometimes, we may not care about others 
making copies of databases. What we care about is that the relational databases are authentic 
and any modifications can be detected or recovered.  
This is increasingly important in many applications where relational databases are publicly 
available on the Internet. For example, to provide convenient access to information for users, 
governmental and public institutions are increasingly required to publish their data on the 
Internet [17]. The released data are usually in tabular form. They may be statistical data 
produced by Census Bureau demographic surveys and Federal agencies such as National Center 
for Education Statistics and Energy Information Administration; they may also be databases 
released by the Department of Motor Vehicles and Health Maintenance Organizations [19]. In 
these cases, all released data are public; what is critical for the owner of the data is to make sure 
that the released data are not tampered with. 
We can consider another application of edge computing where databases are distributed to edge 
servers that perform data processing on behalf of the central server [17]. Since the edge servers 
may not be trusted, to ensure the relational databases are not modified by the edge servers, the 
central server may need to check the integrity of the relational databases regularly. 
To check the integrity of relational databases, an intuitive method is to use the traditional digital 
signature to detect the alterations of databases [3]. A hash value is computed over a relational 
database and then is signed with the owner's private key. The generated signature is then 
appended to the database or stored separately. Though this method is very simple, there are 
some problems with it. First, the signature can only be used to verify whether the database has 
been modified or not; it cannot be used to localize and recover the modifications. Second, for a 
very large database, the failure of integrity verification will render the whole database useless. 
Finally, if there is a need to make some necessary modifications to the database, we have to 
compute a new signature and discard the previous one. Besides, it is computationally intensive 
to generate and verify the signatures. Due to these problems, it is desirable that we have a 
fragile watermarking scheme for relational databases so that any modifications can be detected, 
localized and successfully recovered. In this way, even if some part of a relational database has 
been altered, after localizing these modifications, and then we only need to repair the modified 
data by recovering the true data from modified locations and in such way we ensure that the 
whole of the data set is still authentic and reliable. In addition, because the fragile watermarking 
scheme is private key based, its computational cost is obviously less than that of digital 
signature schemes. 
In this paper, we proposed a fragile watermarking scheme to verify the integrity of a relational 
database and recover the true database. In the proposed scheme, all tuples in a relational 
database are first divided into groups by using a secret key. After that Watermarks are 
embedded in all groups and then watermark verification done independently in each group. The 
embedded watermarks cannot only detect but also localize the modifications made to the 
database, and even recover the true data from modified cells in database tables. Since the 
watermarking process will inevitably introduce small distortions to a relational database, we 
assume that the relational database to be watermarked has numerical attributes which tolerate 
small changes.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of related work. 
Section 3 explains in detail our proposed fragile watermarking scheme, including watermark 
embedding, watermark detection and true data recovery. Security analysis of the scheme is 
provided in Section 4. Section 5 concludes this paper with summaries and suggestions for future 
work. 
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2. RELATED WORK 
In recent years, there has been relatively few works on watermarking relational databases. 
Agrawal and Kiernan [2] present a robust watermarking scheme for databases. According to an 
embedding key, some bits of some attributes of some tuples are modified to embed watermark 
bits. Li et al. [11, 12] further extend this scheme to embed multiple bits information instead of 
one bit information as in Agrawal and Kiernan's scheme into a relational database so that 
potential illegal distributors can be tracked. Also, this scheme is claimed to be more robust since 
false negative and false positive detection rates are bounded.  
Sion et al. [18] present a different approach to robust watermarking scheme for databases. In 
their scheme, all tuples are securely sorted and divided into non-intersecting subsets. A single 
watermark bit is embedded into some tuples of a subset by modifying the distribution of tuple 
values. Watermark bits are embedded repeatedly and an error control coding scheme is 
employed to recover the embedded bits. This scheme is claimed to be robust against attacks 
such as data resorting and data transformations. 
Another scheme is proposed by Gross-Amblard [9], where database instances with bounded 
degree Gaifman graph are watermarked while local queries are preserved. They also show that 
the difficulty of query-preserving   watermarking is linked to the informational complexity of 
sets defined by queries. However, they do not analyze the robustness of their scheme, which is a 
very important property of watermarking schemes for copyright protection. 
Devanbu et al. [6] and Pang and Tan [17] present schemes that are based on the Merkle Hash 
Tree, where each tuple is treated as a leaf node and a verifiable B+ tree is constructed by adding 
signed digest for very attribute and for each leaf node recursively until the root node is reached. 
Verification objects are created for query operations to authenticate query results. Though these 
schemes can detect any modifications, they cannot localize the modifications. In addition, they 
have extra overhead for storing and maintaining the tree. 
All current robust watermarking schemes for relational databases are designed for copyright 
protection. Guo et al. [1] present a fragile watermarking scheme that cannot only detect but also 
localize the modifications made to the database, it was the most complete scheme which has 
been introduced yet. In this scheme all tuples in a relational database are first divided into 
groups then by using a hash function Watermarks are embedded and verified group by group 
independently according to some security parameters. The embedded watermarks can detect and 
localize the modifications made to the database. In the worst case, the modifications can be 
narrowed down to tuples in a group. 
All current watermarking schemes for relational databases are designed for copyright protection 
or localizing the distortions made to the database tables. But none of them can recover the true 
data from the modified cells in database tables.  
In contrast, our scheme is a novel fragile watermarking scheme that cannot only detect and 
localize the modifications made to the database tables, but also recover the true data from 
modified cells of tables. 
 
3. THE PROPOSED FRAGILE WATERMARKING ALGORITHM 
This section introduces our proposed fragile watermarking scheme which is able to detect and 
localize any malicious modification made to a relational database and also it can recover the 
true data from modified cells. We assume that all attributes of the relational database are 
numeric and the database can tolerate minor distortions introduced by watermark embedding. 
Though the order of tuples can be changed arbitrarily, we assume without loss of generality that 
the order of attributes is not changed. 
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3.1. Watermark Embedding 
Suppose there is a relational database which has a primary key P and y attributes, denoted by 
T(P,A1,A2, . . . ,Ay). All attributes are numeric. Since watermarking will inevitably introduce 
small distortions to attribute values, it is assumed that each attribute value can tolerate 
modifications of at least two least significant bits. Table 1 shows the parameters along with their 
description that are used in this paper. 
Table 1: Parameters and their description 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The watermark embedding algorithm is shown in Algorithms 1 and 2. All tuples are first 
divided into groups according to the number of groups g, the hash value of a embedding key K, 
and their primary key. For the security reason, the embedding key should be selected from a 
large enough key space so that it is computationally infeasible for an attacker to guess the key. 
Only the one who has the knowledge of K and g can determine the group that the tuples belong 
to. The tuples in each group are then sorted based on their primary key. The grouping and 
sorting operations are very important in our algorithm. 
Since tuples in a relational database are independent, it is very important to enforce some 
relationship between them so that the embedded watermarks and the extracted watermarks can 
be synchronized. Note that grouping and sorting do not change tuples' physical positions in the 
table.  
In watermark embedding, watermark detection and true data recovering, we ignore the least two 
significant bits of all attributes except the primary key when computing hash values. 
 
Description Parameter 
Number of attributes in the relation y 
Number of tuples in the relation 
 
w 
Number of groups in the table 
 
g 
Average number of tuples in a group 
 
v 
The k-th group 
 
Gk 
The j-th attribute of the i-th tuple in a group 
 
ri.Aj 
Watermark embedding key K 
Watermark embedded in the j-th attribute of all tuples in a group W j1 
Watermark embedded in all attributes of the i-th tuple in a group W 
i
2 
Original  watermark  extracted from p(j)-th  attribute of all tuples in a group W j* 1 
Original  watermark  extracted from p(j)-th  attribute of all tuples in a group W i* 2 
Watermark verification result for W j1 V
j
1 
Watermark verification result for W i2 V
i
2 
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Algorithm 1: The pseudo code for Watermark embedding 
   1: For  i =1 to  w  do 
   2:   hki =hash(k,ri.p) 
   3:   k =hki  mod  g 
   4:   ri            Gk 
   5: End for  
   6: For  k=1  to g  do 
   7:   sort tuples  in  Gk  according   to  
         Their primary   key 
   8:  embed watermarks to all tuples in Gk 
    
 
    //see the algorithm 2   
   9: End for 
 
Next, watermarks are embedded into each group independently. In each group, there are two 
kinds of watermarks:  
• Attribute watermark W1 which consists of y watermarks of length v.  
• Tuple watermark W2 which consists of v watermarks of length y.  
Accordingly, the embedding subroutine mainly consists of two parts: attribute watermark 
embedding and tuple watermark embedding. In each part, the watermarks to embed are first 
extracted from a one-way hash value. 
For attribute watermarks, the hash value is generated according to a message authentication 
code and the same attribute of all tuples in the group, while for tuple watermarks, it is formed 
according to the same message authentication code and all attribute values of the same tuple. 
For generating the hash value, we use XOR operator as a hash function instead of other 
miscellaneous hash function. This operator has heredity nature and therefore our scheme is able 
to recover the true data from the modified cells of database table.  
The watermark embedding is very simple. For any value ri.Aj, in attribute watermark 
embedding, the least significant bit of ri.Ap(j) is set to i-th bit of W j1 . By using this function our 
scheme is able to embed the extracted attribute watermark from j-th column of group (W j1 
watermark), in another column of group (p(j)-th column of group). This solution is required for 
true data recovery process. The p(j) is shown in the algorithm 3. In the scheme [1], there is not 
such a function. In that scheme generated attribute watermarks from j-th attribute values of 
groups (j-th column values of group) is embedded in the same attribute values (j-th column 
values of table) of groups.  
In tuple watermark embedding, the next least significant bit of ri.Aj is set to the j-th bit of W i2. 
In this way, the embedded watermarks actually form a watermark grid, which helps to detect, 
localize and recover modifications. 
 
3.2. Watermark Detection 
The watermark detection algorithm is shown in Algorithms 4 and 5. To verify the integrity of a 
database relation, we need to know K and g. As in watermark embedding, all tuples are divided 
into groups and each group is verified independently. For each group, we construct two 
verification vectors V1 = (V11, V2 1… Vy1) and V2 = (V12, V32… Vv2) where Vj1 denotes the 
verification result for attribute watermark Wj1 , and Vi2 denotes the verification result for tuple 
watermark Wi2.  
Each element of the vectors is either true or false depending on whether the embedded 
watermark matches the related extracted watermark. Since V1 is for W1 and V2 is for W2, to get 
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Vj1 (j ∈ [1, y]), the watermark extracted from the least significant bits of all tuples' j-th attribute 
and the watermark constructed from the hash value of the message authentication code and the 
j-th attribute of all tuples in a same group are compared. If the two matches, Vj1 is true, 
otherwise, it is false. Likewise, to get Vi2 (i ∈ [1, v]), the watermark extracted from the next 
least significant bits of the i-th tuple's all attributes and the watermark constructed from the hash 
value of the message authentication code and all attributes of the i-th tuple are compared. If the 
two matches, Vi2 is true, otherwise, it is false. From the two vectors V1 and V2, we can detect, 
localize and characterize any modifications made to tuples in a group.  
 
From the watermark embedding and detection algorithms, we can easily see that the 
computational complexity of both algorithms is in the order of the number of tuples in the 
relational database; that is, the complexity is O(w). 
 
Algorithm 2: the pseudo code for Watermark embedding in Gk 
  1: For j=1 to y  do    
  2:  Hj1 = XOR(k , r1.Aj , r2.Aj ,…, rv.Aj) 
       //exclude the least two significant bits  
       // of all values                                                                                                                                                                                                         
  3:  Wj1=extractbits(hj1,v) //see algorithm 5     
  4:   For i=1 to v do  
  5:    Wj1(i)           least significant bit of ri.Ap(j) 
           // p(j) is shown in algorithm 3  
  6:    End for  
  7: End for  
  8:  For i = 1 to v do 
  9:    hi2 =hash (k, ri.A1, ri.A2 ,…, ri.Ay)   
         //exclude the least two significant bits  
         //of all values                                                                            
 10:  Wi2= extractbits(hi2,y)       //see algorithm 6 
 11:    For j=1 to y do 
 12:    Wi2(j)         next least significant bit of  ri.Aj 
 13:    End for  
 14: End for 
 
Algorithm 3: The pseudo code of p (j) 
 1: p(j)= ( (k+j) mod (y-1) ) +1  
     // return a number between [1..y]   
 
Algorithm 4: The pseudo code for Watermark verification 
   1: for  i =1 to  w  do 
   2:    hki = hash (k,ri.p)  
   3:    k = hki  mod  g 
   4:    ri            Gk    
   5: end   for       
   6: for  k =1  to g  do 
   7:   Sort tuples in Gk according to their 
         primary key  value   
   8:   Verify the integrity of Gk       
          //see algorithm 5 
   9: End for 
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Algorithm 5: the pseudo code for Verification the authenticity of Gk 
   1: For j=1 to y  do 
    2:  hj1 = XOR(k , r1.Aj , r2.Aj ,  … , rv.Aj) 
        //exclude the  least two significant bits 
        //of all values 
    3:  Wj1=extractbits (hj1,v) 
         //see algorithm 6 
    4:     For i=1 to v do 
    5:      Wj*1(i )          least significant bit of  ri.Ap(j) 
    6:     End for 
    7:    If  Wj*1 ≠ Wj1 then  Vj1= false  
    8:    Else Vj1= true  
    9:    End if    
  10: End for 
  11: For j = 1 to y do  
  12:    If  (Vj1= false) and  (Vp(j)1 = false) 
               then Vj1=true 
   13:    End if 
   14: End for      
   15: For i=1 to v  do  
   16:    hi2=hash (k, ri.A1, ri.A2 ,…, ri.Ay) 
           //exclude the least two significant 
           // bits of all values 
  17:   Wi2= extractbits(hi2,y)    
           //see algorithm 6 
   18:   For j=1 to y do 
   19:    Wi*2(j)        next least significant bit of ri.Aj   
   20:   End for 
   21:   If  wi*2 ≠ wi2  then  Vi2 =false  else Vi2 = true  
   22:   End if      
   23: End for 
 
Algorithm 6: The pseudo code for ExtractBits(H,L) 
   1:  If  length (H) ≥ L then 
   2:    W = concatenation of L most 
           significant bits from  H 
   3:  Else  m= L – length(H) 
   4:   W= concatenation of  H and extractbits (H,M) 
   5:  End if   
  6:  Return W  
 
3.3. Localization of the Modifications 
The ability to localize the modifications is one of our scheme advantages. Since the tuples are 
grouped based on the number of groups g and the hash value of the embedding key and their 
primary key, changing the order of tuples does not affect the embedded watermarks. 
It is reasonable that the proposed scheme accept such modifications. In our scheme, a single 
value modification can be detected, localized and recovered easily. In the following, we will 
illustrate how to detect a single modification. 
Assume the tuples of a relational database are already divided into groups and the tuples in each 
group are sorted. Figure 1 shows a group which contains 4 tuples and 4 attributes. Suppose r2.A3 
is altered, all relevant watermarks W31 and W22, which are hash functions of r2.A3, also change. 
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Then for all k (1 ≤ k ≤ 4), Vk1 is true except V31. For all q (1 ≤ q ≤ 4), Vq2 is true except V22. 
From this result, we can easily see that r2.A3 has been altered. Figure 1 shows the related 
verification result. The blue line denotes successful verification while the red line denotes failed 
verification. This example shows the detection and localization of a non-primary key 
modification. If the modified value is a primary key, the modification can still be located, but it 
can only be located to one or two groups. 
 
Figure 1: An illustration of verification results in a cell 
 
3.4. True Data Recovery 
Other advantage of our proposed scheme is the ability to recover the true data from modified 
cells. After detection and localization the modified cells, our scheme can recover the true data. 
As mentioned, in attribute watermark embedding we use XOR operator as a hash function to 
generate attribute watermark code. The input values of this operator to generate j-th attribute 
watermark (wj1), include the j-th attribute values of group and output value of this operator was 
embedded in p(j)th attribute values of group therefore by altering one cell value in j-th attribute 
value of a tuple in group, our scheme can extract j-th original attribute watermark of group(wj*1) 
and by using  heredity nature of XOR operator it can recover the original single value of 
modified cell which is participates in original attribute watermark  generation. The true data 
recovery process is shown in algorithm 7. 
 
4. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
In this section we evaluate the security of proposed scheme to recover the true data from single 
modified cell in a database tables. In this evaluation we apply the proposed scheme as an 
application to a database table which has been distorted. We run our scheme on the modified 
table in order to recover the true data from single modified cell. This work is done on several 
tables with the parameter (v=10, 30, 50), (y=10, 20, 30, 40, 50).  
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Algorithm 7: The pseudo code for recovering true data from modified cell 
  1:   For  j= 1 to y  do 
  2:     If  Vj1= false  then  modifiedcolumn = j       
  3:   End for  
  4:   For  i=1 to  v do  
  5:     If  Vi2= false  then  modifiedrow = i 
  6:   End for 
  7:   S  =  k      // k is the secret key   
  8:   For i= 1 to v do    
  9:       If  i≠ modifiedrow  then 
 10:     S  =  S  xor  ri.Amodifiedcolumn 
          //exclude the least two significant 
          // bits of all values                  
 11:     end if 
 12:  end for 
 13:  For i=1 to v do 
 14:      Wmodifiedcolumn*1(i )          least  significant  bit 
            of  ri.Ap(modifiedcolumn) 
 15:  End for 
 16: rmodifiedrow.Amodifiedcolumn=(wmodifiedcolumn*1) xor (S) 
 
The proposed scheme was done 10,000 times for each table, and we calculated the recovery 
failure probability for each table by dividing the number of failure to 10,000. The result is 
shown in Figure 2. According to that, we find out two main conclusions: 
• Recovery Failure probability in all modified table is very teeny as in worst case the 
recovery failure probability for a table (v=10 and y=10) is about 0.001. 
• With the growth of table tuples (v) and tuple attributes (y) the recovery failure probability 
decreases.  
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Figure 2: Failure probabilities for a single value modification. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we proposed a fragile watermarking scheme for relational databases. The 
watermarks are embedded into a relational database on the group basis under the control of a 
secure embedding key. The embedded watermarks form a watermark grid which can detect and 
localize any modifications made to the database and also be able to recover true data from 
modified cells. Experimental results showed that proposed scheme is secure and true data 
recovery failure probability is very teeny. 
Security analysis showed that it is very difficult for an attacker to modify the database without 
affecting the embedded watermarks, and the security upper bound was given. Future work will 
focus on designing a watermarking scheme that can embed watermarks to non-numeric 
attributes. For this purpose we can choose two solutions. The first solution is to reform the 
structure of hash function so it can accept non numeric inputs. The second solution would be 
another mechanism instead of using a hash function.   
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